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ABSTRACT As an interdisciplinary research between watermarking and cryptography, privacy-aware
reversible watermarking permits a party to entrust the task of embedding watermarks to a cloud service
provider without compromising information privacy. The early development of schemes were primarily
based upon traditional symmetric-key cryptosystems, which involve an extra implementation cost of key
exchange. Although recent research attentions were drawn to schemes compatible with asymmetric-key
cryptosystems, there were notable limitations in the practical aspects. In particular, the host signal must
either be enciphered in a redundant way or be pre-processed prior to encryption, which would largely
limit the storage efficiency and scheme universality. To relax the restrictions, we propose a novel research
paradigm and devise different schemes compatible with different homomorphic cryptosystems. In the
proposed schemes, the encoding function is recognised as an operation of adding noise, whereas the
decoding function is perceived as a corresponding denoising process. Both online and offline content-
adaptive predictors are developed to assist watermark decoding for various operational requirements.
A three-way trade-off between the capacity, fidelity and reversibility is analysed mathematically and
empirically. It is shown that the proposed schemes achieve the state-the-art performance.
INDEX TERMS Cloud computing, cyber security, homomorphic cryptosystems, information privacy,
reversible watermarking, signal denoising, statistical inference, variational method.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE past decades have witnessed the phenomenal preva-lence of public cloud services. The seemingly unlimited
storage and computational capacity of the cloud have opened
up opportunities for businesses and individuals to entrust
their data to cloud service providers. Meanwhile, the rapid
development of cloud computing technology has also raised
privacy and security concerns. A powerful solution against
cyber security threats is to obfuscate the classified documents
through encryption [1]. On the other hand, although encryp-
tion algorithms are widely used to protect the confidential
information, some desirable functionalities might be unreal-
isable for the encrypted data. In response to this issue, there
was a surge of research interest in secure signal processing
in the encrypted domain [2]–[4]. As an emerging topic in
this research field, privacy-aware watermarking has attracted
a lot of attention in recent years. For the reason that many
watermarking algorithms are proprietary properties, there are
restrictions for commercial purposes and the availability to
the general public is rather limited. An efficient solution is
to request an authorised cloud service provider to encode the
watermark into the given digital media, not only due to the
high computational capacity of the cloud, but also the legiti-
mate consent to carry out the algorithms. On the other hand,
since the cloud server is regarded as a semi-honest entity that
may collect some information from the digital contents, data
privacy should be taken into account. Therefore, the research
of privacy-aware watermarking addresses the problem of
entrusting the task of watermarking to a cloud server without
compromising data privacy. This research trend is also known
as watermarking in the encrypted domain.
Watermarking is the practice of imperceptibly embedding
the watermark into the host media (e.g. audio, image and
video), where the watermark is usually a piece of informa-
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FIGURE 1. The proposed watermarking protocol. A transmitter Alice wants to protect a signal through embedding a watermark, which can be fulfilled by a cloud
service provider Charlie. Then, a marked signal is transmitted over a insecure channel to a recipient Bob who is able to verify the authenticity of the received signal
through analysing the extracted watermark and reproduce the original signal.
tion associated with the host media (e.g. digital identity or
signature). In general, there are three parties involved in a
watermarking protocol: a sender who encodes the watermark
into the host media, a recipient who decodes the watermark
from the marked media, and an adversary who has a mali-
cious intent against the protocol. The malicious party is often
modelled as a noisy channel between the encoder and the
decoder. The watermarking strategy can be either fragile or
robust against the channel noise depending on the applica-
tions. Conventionally, robust watermarking is applicable to
copyright protection [5]–[8], whereas fragile watermarking
is advantageous to data authentication [9]–[12]. Neverthe-
less, fragile watermarking, as a temper detection technique,
contradict itself by inevitably inflicting distortions upon the
content of media. Although the distortions are generally
imperceptible, the effect could be arguable in particular cir-
cumstances featuring a strict integrity requirement, especially
when the host media is used for military reconnaissance or
medical diagnosis. Considering these potential applications,
the notion of reversible watermarking was introduced in
order to permit the reproduction of the original content once
the authenticity of media is verified [13]–[20].
Consider a watermarking protocol as illustrated in Fig.
1, where a sender Alice wants to communicate a digital
content to a receiver Bob over an insecure channel. In order
to resist malicious tampering, Alice has to embed a signature,
which is sensitive against manipulations, into the content
prior to dispatching it to Bob. Supposing that Alice, as a
general individual, has no permission or resources to employ
the watermarking algorithm, the task of watermarking has
therefore to be entrusted to a licensed cloud server Charlie.
As a general presumption, Charlie is an honest-but-curious
party who would not deviate from the protocol specifications,
though on the other hand has the interest in learning the
privacy information of the content. Hence, due to privacy
concerns, Alice encrypts the content prior to commissioning
it to Charlie for watermarking. In summary, to utilise the
complementary advantages of watermarking and cryptogra-
phy, it is of great significance to develop a secure reversible
watermarking system that enables the watermarking function
to be operated by a licensed third party in the encrypted
domain in order to preserve privacy.
The challenge of reversible watermarking in the encrypted
domain is a rather difficult one. Considering that the message
is concealed by encryption, we are not able to observe,
analyse, and exploit data redundancy. One of the very first
schemes utilises the electronic codebook (ECB) mode of
block ciphers to encipher the data, which preserves the data
redundancy by reusing the secret key for each block while
compromising the security strength [21]. To overcome the se-
curity weakness, the researchers have developed schemes for
a variety of secure cryptosystems. For instance, an attempt
was made by encoding watermarks into data encrypted by the
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode [22]. In a similar manner,
some methods were proposed to encode watermarks into data
encrypted by steam cipher [23]–[25]. In essence, these early
schemes were based upon the research outcomes of lossless
compression of the encrypted data [26]–[28]. Apart from this,
the early development of schemes was primarily compatible
with symmetric-key cryptosystems [29]–[31]. Accordingly,
these schemes are confronted with a practical issue that a
secret key must be pre-shared between the sender and the
recipient. In order to communicate the secret key, a secure
channel resistant to eavesdropping or a secure key exchange
protocol must be established. Any of these solutions comes
with extra costs in implementation.
In contrast to symmetric-key algorithms, asymmetric-key
algorithms, also known as public-key cryptosystems, relax
the restriction by using a publicly distributed key for en-
cryption and a secret key known only to the recipient for
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decryption. Over the last few years, the watermarking re-
search has extended to manage ciphers generated by public-
key algorithms. The first class of strategy encrypts the data in
such a manner that the input to the encryption function has
a value range that is far smaller than it should be. Consider
that each individual pixel is an input to be enciphered. The
value range of pixels is between 0 and 255 for 8-bit greyscale
images, while the message space of a given cryptosystem is,
for example, between 0 and N , where N is the product of
two large primes. Therefore, the input space defined by the
watermarking shceme is much smaller than the actual mes-
sage space defined by the cryptosystem. In implementation,
a number of zeros are concatenated to the end of the input
message to assure the length of input conform with message
space. As a consequence, zero paddings can be viewed as
additional redundancy for accommodating the payload in the
encrypted domain [32]–[34]. It is nevertheless deficient for
the following reasons. First, redundant bits are appended and
thus the system is not space-efficient. Second, from some
viewpoints it is considered problematic since the amount
of padded redundancy is at least equivalent to that of the
payload in most cases. One may even simply append the pay-
load information after the host signal rather than performing
complex computation to trade the pre-appended redundancy
for the payload. Third, it is insecure since the watermark
can be easily filtered out by decryption. To overcome these
deficiencies, we suggest to encrypt a bit-stream of sufficient
length each time, instead a single sample with zero-padding.
The second class of strategy, though following the space-
saving principle, requires a specific type of pre-processing
to be applied prior to encryption. It utilises either truncation
[35] or self-embedding [36] to shrink the range of sample
values and then encrypts a sufficient number of samples each
time. As a result, although the input space seems to be equal
to the message space defined by the cryptosystem, the actual
input space is much smaller. For instance, initially the sample
values range from 0 to 255 and yet subsequent to data pre-
processing the possible values reduce into a subrange. The
reserved space can then be exploited to accommodate the
payload in the encrypted domain. This class of strategy, also
known as reserving room before encryption, was first devel-
oped for watermarking schemes to work in conjunction with
symmetric-key cryptosystems [37]–[39]. The practicality of
this strategy is however limited because a specific type of
pre-processing must be applied to the data. To remove this
restriction, we suggest to manage data without any specific
pre-processing.
In this paper, we address the problem of entrusting the
task of watermarking to a cloud service provider without
compromising information privacy. Considering the secu-
rity threats of symmetric-key cryptosystems, we study re-
versible watermarking schemes compatible with public-key
cryptosystems. The recent development of schemes requires
the host data either to be enciphered in a redundant fashion
or to be pre-processed prior to encryption. In response to
this, we propose a novel research paradigm to overcome the
aforementioned shortcomings. Two schemes are proposed to
cope with ciphers generated by two types of homomorphic
cryptosystems, respectively. The first scheme is constructed
based upon multiplicative homomorphism and provides high
content fidelity as well as high flexibility in watermarking
capacity. The second scheme is devised based upon addi-
tive homomorphism and achieves an optimal reversibility.
In addition to this, both online and offline content-adaptive
predictors are introduced to assist watermark decoding. The
former type of predictor is based upon variational method
and utilises an iterative algorithm to approximate the signal,
while the second type of predictor is based upon statistical
inference and pre-trains a probability table for signal estima-
tion. Experimental results shows that the proposed predictors
achieve the state-of-the-art performance. In summary, several
positive contributions and improvements are made, which are
briefly outlined as follows:
• Modern public-key cryptosystems are adopted to avoid
the security risks and implementation costs of key ex-
change.
• Reversible watermarking schemes compatible with dif-
ferent types of partially homomorphic cryptosystems
are studied.
• Storage efficiency is considered by encrypting a suffi-
ciently long sequence of bits, instead of a single sample
with redundant zero padding, each time.
• Specific type of data pre-processing prior to encryption
is not required, which enhances the practicality and
universality.
• Both online and offline content-adaptive predictors are
developed with flexibility for various operational re-
quirements.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses various cryptosystems and how to apply
them on digital images. Section III introduces the proposed
watermarking scheme for multiplicative homomorphic cryp-
tosystem. Section IV further derives a scheme for addi-
tive homomorphic cryptosystem. Section V studies content-
adaptive predictors based upon variational method and statis-
tical inference. Section VI evaluates the scheme performance
and makes comparisons with state-of-the-art algorithms. Sec-
tion VII concludes our work and outlines the directions for
future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The notion of privacy homomorphisms was introduced by
Rivest et al. [40], which was described as particular algebraic
mappings between the paintext and ciphertext spaces that al-
low the result of operations upon the ciphertexts, when deci-
phered, to match the result of operations upon the plaintexts.
A well-understood example of multiplicative homomorphism
would be the RSA cryptosystem whose security strength is
known to be equivalent to the difficulty of solving integer
factorisation [41]. Suppose that p and q are two large primes
and the modulus is computed as N = p · q. Let e and d
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be the public and private keys of the RSA cryptosystem,
respectively, such that e and d satisfy the condition that
e · d ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)), (1)
where φ is Euler’s phi function, i.e. φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
The RSA cryptosystem defines an encryption function
c ≡ me (mod N), (2)
and a decryption function
m ≡ cd (mod N), (3)
where m denotes the message and c denotes the cipher.
Consider the goal of generating the encrypted result which,
when decrypted, matches the product of two messages m1
and m2 through the operations upon the ciphers c1 and c2.
This goal can be achieved by multiplying two ciphers as
c1 · c2 ≡ (m1e) · (m2e) (mod N)
≡ (m1 ·m2)e (mod N).
(4)
In other words,
D(E(m1) · E(m2)) = m1 ·m2, (5)
where E(·) and D(·) denote the encryption and decryption
functions, respectively.
The RSA cryptosystem is limited, however, by solely
permitting the multiplication of messages. As a consequence,
to design homomorphic encryption algorithms that permit
various mathematical operations upon ciphers has been one
of the active research areas, within which there are substantial
achievements such as ElGamal [42], Okamoto–Uchiyama
[43], and Damgård–Jurik [44] cryptosystems. Among a va-
riety of historical antecedents, the Paillier cryptosystem has
been widely used as an example of additive homomorphism
[45]. The system consists of three phases: key generation,
encryption, and decryption. In the key generation phase,
we choose two large primes p and q. Then, we compute
N = pq and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1), where ‘lcm’ stands
for least common multiple. Next, we select a random integer
g ∈ Z/N2Z∗ and calculate
µ ≡ (L(gλ (mod N2)))−1 (mod N), (6)
where
L(x) =
x− 1
N
. (7)
As a result, the public key is (n, g) and the private key is
(λ, µ). In the encryption phase, let m be a message to be
encrypted and r be a randomly selected integer, wherem, r ∈
Z/NZ. The ciphertext is then computed as
c ≡ gm · rN (mod N2). (8)
In the decryption phase, the plaintext message is deciphered
by
m ≡ L(cλ (mod N2)) · µ (mod N). (9)
Let m1 and m2 be two messages and c1 and c2 be two
ciphers. To produce the cipher of sum of m1 and m2, we
calculate the product of c1 and c2 and obtain
c1 · c2 ≡ (gm1 · r1N ) · (gm2 · r2N ) (mod N2)
≡ g(m1+m2) · (r1 · r2)N (mod N2).
(10)
To yield the cipher of product ofm1 andm2, we compute the
exponentiation of c1 by m2 such that
cm21 ≡ (gm1 · r1N )m2 (mod N2)
≡ g(m1·m2) · (rm21 )N (mod N2).
(11)
As an alternative expression, we write
D(E(m1) · E(m2)) = m1 +m2, (12)
and
D(E(m1)m2) = m1 ·m2. (13)
It can be observed that the size of encrypted data is expanded
as the message space isM = Z/NZ and the ciphertext space
is C = Z/N2Z∗.
As aforementioned, when encrypting a digital image, it is
not advisable to consider each pixel as an individual message.
Generally, the value range of pixels is far smaller than the
message space, as the latter is associated with large prime
numbers, which provokes dispensable redundancy. Apart
from this, if the watermark is embedded into the addition
redundancy created by encryption, it will be filtered out by
decryption, which limits the applicability of the schemes.
There are several possible approaches to image encryption
without expanding image files, for example, converting the
image into bit-stream and encrypting a segment of sufficient
length each time. In order to preserve the visual significance,
we propose to encipher each bit-plane separately. Let I
denote an 8-bit digital image such that
I = (b1||b2|| . . . ||b8), (14)
where ‘||’ is the concatenation operator and b1, b2, . . . , and
b8 are eight different bit-planes. For each bit-plane
bi = (bi,1||bi,2|| . . . ), (15)
we sample a sufficiently long bit-stream each time to form
a message, which is then encrypted into a cipher. Supposing
that the message space of a given cryptosystem is Z/NZ, a
message is therefore a decimal number of log2N bits, or of
blog2Nc bits more precisely, considering that the former is
not necessarily an integer.
The watermarking process is performed sequentially upon
the selected messages until all the payload is embedded,
while the unselected ones remain intact. Due to the fidelity
constraint, we only change the messages converted from
insignificant bit-planes. Intuitively, it seems that the optimal
choice should be to select messages of the least significant
bit-plane. However, by considering the decoding process, it
is necessary that the selected messages are formed by some
well-predictable bits. We shall see the reason behind this
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FIGURE 2. Watermarking procedures for a selected symbol. Let x be a host symbol and w be a watermark symbol. Alice encrypts x into E(x). Charlie encodes
E(x) with w into E(y). Bob decrypts E(y) into y and then decodes it into xˆ and wˆ.
later. To pave the way for the following presentation, let
us assume that the messages for watermarking have been
determined. The map to record the locations of selected
messages serves as the watermarking key. In the following
paragraphs, we will discuss separately how we cope with
ciphers generated by different types of cryptosystems.
III. MULTIPLICATIVE HOMOMORPHISM
Let us recapitulate the problem statement. Let Alice denote a
sender, Bob a recipient, and Charlie a cloud server. Suppose
that Alice wants to deliver to Bob a digital file in which
a watermark is embedded for authentication purposes. Due
to various constraints (e.g. proprietary issues), Alice has to
entrust the task of watermarking to Charlie by providing
the encrypted file and the watermark. The encryption key is
publicly known, while the decryption key is only known to
Bob. We assume that the watermark payload is a sequence of
compressed and encrypted digits such that only the intended
recipient Bob is able to decode it.
Consider the objective of embedding watermarks into ci-
phers generated by a multiplicative homomorphic cryptosys-
tem such as RSA. The preliminary procedures are as follows.
To begin with, the host data is divided into binary sequences
of the length in accordance with the message space of the
given cryptosystem. Then, each sequence is transformed into
an integer called a symbol. After encryption, a sufficient
number of enciphered symbols are selected to carry the
watermark payload. We suppose that the selected symbols are
all composed of bits in the l-th bit-plane. To meet the fidelity
requirement, the change of bits in the l-th bit-plane must not
provoke a significant degradation to the visual quality of the
image. For conciseness, we describe only how a single host
symbol is processed, as shown in Fig. 2.
Let p and q be two large primes andN = p·q. The alphabet
of watermark symbols is defined as the set of k distinct
positive integers up toN that are coprime toN . Accordingly,
we are able to embed log2 k bits of watermark information
per host symbol. The number of positive integers up to N
that are relatively prime toN can be calculated by Euler’s phi
function φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1) and thus k ≤ φ(N). This
alphabet, denoted by W = {wi}k−1i=0 , is pre-shared between
Alice and Bob and serves as a codebook so that different
payloads can be represented by different watermark symbols.
Let a host symbol be x ∈ Z/NZ and a watermark symbol
be w ∈ W . To begin with, Alice encrypts x into E(x) and
uploads it along with E(w) to Charlie. The watermarking
process is then operated by
E(y) ≡ E(x) · E(w) ≡ E(w · x) (mod N). (16)
After that, the marked and encrypted symbol E(y) is down-
loaded and sent to Bob and is then decrypted into
y ≡ D(E(y)) ≡ w · x (mod N). (17)
Note that we strictly let w0 = 1 in practice in order to
minimise the average distortion. That is, when w = w0,
the marked symbol will be kept intact. The distortion only
occurs when w = wi, ∀i 6= 0, is embedded. We know that
there exists a unique modular multiplicative inverse of an
arbitrary integer a modulo N if and only if gcd(a,N) = 1.
Since W is a subset of all integers that are coprime to N ,
we can construct the set W = {w−1i }k−1i=0 that comprises of
the corresponding unique inverses. We generate k possible
candidates for x in such a way that each is given by
xi ≡ y · w−1i (mod N). (18)
The above congruence can be rewritten as
xi ≡ x · w · w−1i (mod N). (19)
Thus, we see that xi = x if and only if w−1i = w
−1. In
other words, if we are able to distinguish x from k possible
candidates {xi}k−1i=0 , then we can determine w jointly. Recall
that a selected symbol is composed of bits that can be
estimated with a certain degree of accuracy from some other
correlated bits. Let us denote an estimated symbol for x by
x˜. Therefore, the original x is determined by
xˆ = arg min
xi
∆(xi, x˜), (20)
where ∆ is a general distortion metric (e.g. Hamming dis-
tance). The reversibility, namely the ability to recover the
host media, primarily depends on two factors. One is the
number of candidates and the other is the estimation ac-
curacy. The reason is straightforward. Given only a few
possibilities and a highly credible clue, there is a high prob-
ability that the answer is correctly deduced. The number of
candidates is governed by the capacity parameter k, whereas
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the estimation accuracy is related to the fidelity parameter l.
Hence, we summarise that
Capacity ∝ k,
Fidelity ∝ l−1,
Reversibility ∝ l · k−1.
(21)
Example. Let us demonstrate the scheme with an example
as follows. Assume that p = 11, q = 19, and N = 209. Let a
payload bit be encoded by
w =
{
w0, if the bit is 0,
w1, if the bit is 1,
where w0 and w1 can be any two numbers coprime to 209.
Note that w0 is strictly set to one in practice and we let
w1 = 3 in this example. Suppose that Alice has a host
symbol x = 100 and wants to embed a bit one. As a result,
the watermark symbol is given by w = w1. By encryption,
Alice outputs E(x) = E(100). After watermarking, Charlie
produces E(y) ≡ E(3)·E(100) mod 209. By decryption, Bob
obtains y = 91, which is computed by
91 ≡ 3 · 100 mod 209.
The modular multiplicative inverses ofw0 andw1 arew−10 =
1 and w−11 = 70, respectively. Hence, two candidates for x
are x0 = 91 and x1 = 100, which are computed by
91 ≡ 91 · 1 mod 209,
100 ≡ 91 · 70 mod 209,
respectively. Suppose that the approximation of x is x˜ = 102.
We determine the value of x as that of the closest candidate
to x˜ in terms of the Hamming distance and the value of w as
that of the one whose inverse yields the minimum Hamming
distance. The distances are calculated by
∆0 = ∆(91, 102) = 5,
∆1 = ∆(100, 102) = 1,
and therefore the decoding results are xˆ = 100 and wˆ = 3.
It can be observed that the wrong candidate is, theoreti-
cally, a random integer. Thus, if N is sufficiently large and
the number of candidates to distinguish from is relatively
small, then it is unlikely that randomly drawn integers would
be closer to the approximation of the correct one than the
correct one itself.
IV. ADDITIVE HOMOMORPHISM
We have seen that the reversibility of the previous scheme is
managed by the minimum distance between possible candi-
dates and the correct one, which is random in this very case
when only the multiplicative homomorphism is permitted.
To achieve a better performance, let us consider embedding
watermarks into ciphers produced by an additive homomor-
phic cryptosystem such as the Paillier cryptosystem. For this
type of cryptosystem, there exists an optimal strategy to
maximise the Hamming distance between candidates in a
special case that only one bit is embedded per symbol and
there are only two candidates to be distinguished from in the
decoding process (i.e. k = 2). Certainly, there is always a
trade-off. In this case, it is the non-trivial data expansion from
the message space to the cipher space due to homomorphic
encryption and a little compromise on the fidelity due to
distance maximisation.
Before proceeding further, let us introduce another view-
point of this research problem, as diagramed in Fig. 3. Let
Alice be a sender and Bob be a recipient. There are two
communication channels between the two parties: a noiseless
channel and a noisy channel. Let us assume that the noiseless
channel is much more expensive than the noisy one, which
complies with our intuition. Suppose that a message can
be decomposed into several pieces of components and each
component is transmitted over one of the channels. Alice
wants the communication cost to be as low as possible. Bob,
on the other hand, requires that the core idea of the message
must be clear and comprehensible regardless of some errors
induced by the channel noise. In other words, the noisy
components must not lead to the misunderstanding upon the
core idea of the message. Moreover, Bob hopes that the
errors can be corrected from the context given by the other
correct components. Suppose that each message component
is concealed in a safe envelope during the transmission.
Nevertheless, the noisy channel is still capable of adding
noise to the components even without opening the envelope,
imagining that raindrops pass through the envelope and wet
the letter.
This research problem is analogous to that of reversible
watermarking in the encrypted domain in the following
senses. First, the noisy channel is analogous to the water-
marking function. Second, the reciprocal of the communi-
cation cost corresponds to the watermarking capacity. Third,
the requirement of preserving the core idea of the message is
equivalent to the fidelity constraint of watermarking. Last, the
context-based error correction is akin to the decoding process
that jointly detects the payload and recovers the host media.
The task of error correction will be easy if the noisy channel
always modifies the components to those of the opposite
meaning in the presence of noise. The reason is that given
a certain context, it is much easier to sense an antonym of a
word than a synonym of that word. Hence, our objective is
to construct a noisy channel that always maps components to
their farthest counterparts in the presence of noise, that is to
say,
E(y) =
{
E(x), if no noise occurs,
E(x¯), otherwise, (22)
where x¯ is the farthest counterpart of x. Let x be a non-
negative integer composed of bits from a certain bit-plane
and x¯ be the bitwise complement of x. Although the Paillier
cryptosystem does not permit homomorphic bitwise comple-
ment operation upon the encrypted data, we are still able to
obtain E(x¯) by
E(x¯) ≡ E(2t−1) · E(x)−1 ≡ E(2t−1−x) mod N2, (23)
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FIGURE 3. Watermarking as noise adding. Alice demultiplexes and encrypts the host signal into encrypted components and then sends each component over
either a noiseless or noisy channel. Bob decrypts and multiplexes the received components into a noisy signal.
where t = blog2Nc be the number of bits used to describe x.
We will prove that x¯ = 2t− 1− x later. Hence, the encoding
process is carried out by
E(y) ≡
{
E(x) mod N2, if w = 0,
E(2t − 1) · E(x)−1 mod N2, if w = 1, (24)
and the decoding process is performed by
(x,w) =
{
(y, 0), if ∆(y, y˜) < ∆(y¯, y˜),
(y¯, 1), otherwise,
(25)
where y¯ is the bitwise compliment of y, y˜ is the approxima-
tion of y, and ∆ is the measure of the Hamming distance.
Lemma. Let x be a non-negative integer, x¯ be the bitwise
compliment of x, and t = blog2Nc be the number of bits
used to describe x. Then, x¯ = 2t − 1− x.
Proof. Let us prove that
x+ x¯ = 2t − 1
such that
x⊕ x¯ = 11 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t bits
, ∀x, x¯ ∈ Z/2tZ,
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation. This is proved
by the fact that integer addition is equivalent to bitwise XOR
and 2t − 1 = 20 + 21 + · · ·+ 2t−1 = 11 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t bits
.
V. CONTENT-ADAPTIVE PREDICTORS
Let us demonstrate how to implement the estimation mech-
anisms in a practical sense. Suppose that the host data is a
digital image. Recall that we have to estimate the symbols in
order to activate the decoding process. A symbol is defined
as an integer converted from some randomly drawn bits from
the l-th bit-plane. Therefore, the objective is to estimate those
selected bits. A possible strategy is to estimate the pixel itself.
This strategy is advantageous in terms of the implementa-
tion cost since there are a lot of image reconstruction tools
available already, such as the total variation denoising algo-
rithm [46]. Nonetheless, most content-adaptive predictors are
‘online’ processing algorithms and thus it is computationally
demanding for the decoder to perform those algorithms. In
response to this, we further devise an ‘offline’ processing
mechanism that efficiently infers the l-th bit of the given
pixel by a pre-learned lookup table. The approach is derived
from the Bayesian inference. We remark that these online
and offline algorithms can be viewed as a classic example
of space-time tradeoff. We begin with the implementation of
the total variation denoising algorithm and then continue with
the formulation of the Bayesian inference.
A. TOTAL VARIATION DENOISING
Let us consider a marked image as a noisy signal. The result
of noise removal can be perceived as our expectation of the
original signal. Recall that when the l-th bit-plane is taken
as the watermarking channel, the l-th bit of each modifiable
pixel is either flipped or kept intact. Therefore, by comparing
the marked image with its denoised counterpart, we are able
to infer whether an observed pixel has been modified or
not. For instance, suppose that a pixel u is used to carry
a watermark bit. At the receiving end, we want to know
whether u = u0 or u = u1, where u0 and u1 denote the pixel
values by setting the l-th bit of u to 0 and 1, respectively. By
applying a denoising technique, we obtain an approximation
of u denoted by u˜. We contend that the value of u is the
one that minimises the Euclidean distance between u and u˜.
Let u be a sequence of pixels to carry a watermark bit and
u˜ be an approximation of it. In practice, we tend to use an
appropriately long sequence of pixels to carry one single bit
of information in order to minimise the error rate, although,
on the other hand, compromising the embedding rate. To
decide whether u = u0 or u = u1, we calculate
∆0 = ‖u0 − u˜‖1 =
∑
i
|u0,i − u˜i|,
∆1 = ‖u1 − u˜‖1 =
∑
i
|u1,i − u˜i|,
(26)
and choose the vector that produces a smaller L1 norm.
Total variation denoising is based on the principle that
noisy signals have high total variation. According to this
principle, the denoising problem is modelled as minimising
the total variation of the reconstructed signal subject to it
being close to the original observed signal. Let the intensity
function u0(x, y) denote the pixel intensity of an observed
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noisy image and u(x, y) the pixel values of the desired clean
image for x, y ∈ Ω. Hence,
u0(x, y) = u(x, y) + n(x, y), (27)
where n(x, y) denotes the additive noise with zero mean
and standard deviation σ. The objective is to remove n and
reconstruct u from u0. The variational model is to minimise∫∫
Ω
|∇u| dx dy, (28)
subject to
1
2
∫∫
Ω
(u− u0)2 dx dy = σ2. (29)
By introducing a Lagrange multiplier λ, this problem can be
converted into an unconstrained optimisation problem, which
is to minimise the functional
J [u] =
∫∫
Ω
|∇u| dx dy + λ
2
∫∫
Ω
(u− u0)2 dx dy. (30)
Let us express the above equation in a compact form by
J =
∫∫
Ω
L(Ω, u,∇u) dΩ. (31)
To minimise J , we find the partial derivatives of L, which are
given by
∂L
∂u
=
∂
∂u
λ
2
(u− u0)2 = λ(u− u0), (32)
and
∂L
∂∇u =
∂L
∂ux
+
∂L
∂uy
=
∇u
|∇u| , (33)
where
∂L
∂ux
=
∂
∂ux
|∇u| = ∂
∂ux
√
u2x + u
2
y
=
∂
∂ux
ψ
1
2 = ψ−
1
2ux =
ux
|∇u| ,
(34)
and similarly
∂L
∂uy
=
∂
∂uy
|∇u| = ∂
∂uy
√
u2x + u
2
y
=
∂
∂uy
ψ
1
2 = ψ−
1
2uy =
uy
|∇u| .
(35)
Note that we let ψ = u2x + u
2
y . By substituting these into the
Euler-Lagrange equation
∂L
∂u
− d
dΩ
(
∂L
∂∇u ) = 0, (36)
we obtain
λ(u− u0)−∇ · ∇u|∇u| = 0. (37)
Therefore, the steepest descent equation for J is given by
∂u
∂t
= λ(u− u0)−∇ · ∇u|∇u| , (38)
uSW
uW
uNW
uS
uO
uN
uSE
uE
uNE
FIGURE 4. A given pixel uO and its correlated neighbouring pixels uN , uS ,
uW , uE , uNW , uNE , uSW and uSE .
and thus at the time t we update
ut+1 = ut + ∂ut
= ut + ∂t(λt(ut − u0)−∇ · ∇u
t
|∇ut| ),
(39)
where
∇ · ∇u|∇u| =
∂
∂x
ux√
(ux)2 + u2y
+
∂
∂y
uy√
u2x + u
2
y
. (40)
At a given pixel uO, let uN , uS , uW and uE denote its four
neighbouring pixels at north, south, west and east directions
respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 4. To simplify the notations,
we denote the four neighbouring pixels altogether by uP ,
where P ∈ Λ = {N,S,W,E}. In the following, we present
the numerical method for updating uO via gradient descent.
The algorithm is performed iteratively until it converges to a
stable state or the default maximum number of iterations is
reached. For each iteration, the numerical approximation of
uO is computed by
ut+1O = u
t
O + ∆t · (λt(utO − u0O)−
1
h
∇utO
|∇utO|
), (41)
where ∆t and h are set to 1 in our implementation. For
convenience, we set λt to a fixed small number instead of
updating it dynamically (λt = 0.001). We discretise
∇utO
|∇utO|
'
∑
P∈Λ
uP − utO√
(uP − utO)2 + ξ2P + 
, (42)
where
ξN =
(uW + uNW )− (uE + uNE)
4
,
ξS =
(uW + uSW )− (uE + uSE)
4
,
ξW =
(uN + uNW )− (uS + uSW )
4
,
ξE =
(uN + uNE)− (uS + uSE)
4
,
(43)
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FIGURE 5. A given bit (coloured in dark grey) and its correlated neighbouring
bits (coloured in light grey).
and  is a very small number to avoid a zero divisor in
practice.
B. BAYESIAN INFERENCE
A statistical approach to estimate the l-th bit of a pixel given
a certain context is to collect a large number of samples under
the same context and see which case, either that the bit is 0 or
1, is observed more frequently. This method will, however,
encounter the so-called curse of dimensionality when the
context is in a high dimensional space. That is, the amount
of data required to support the sampling grows exponentially
with the dimensionality of context. As aforementioned, a
pixel is correlated to its eight immediate neighbours, which
implies that the l-th bit of a given pixel is correlated to
other 7 bits of that pixel and 8 bits of each neighbouring
pixel. In total, there are 71 correlated bits, which represent
271 different contexts. In this case, we require an enormous
amount of data so that there are sufficient samples for each
context.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of context, we model
that the l-th bit of a given pixel is correlated to its immediate
neighbouring bits on the current and the two adjacent bit-
planes, as illustrated in Fig. 5. For the least significant bit-
plane, we consider only the bits on the current and the second
least significant bit-planes. For the most significant bit-plane,
we consider only the bits on the current and the second
most significant bit-planes. There are 8 correlated bits on the
current bit plane, 9 on each of the two adjacent bit-planes.
For a bit on the second to the seventh bit-plane, it has 26
correlated bits and thus 226 possible contexts. For a bit on the
first or last bit-plane, there are 17 correlated bits and accord-
ingly 217 contexts. The number of contexts is significantly
reduced and yet the estimation is still remarkably accurate as
demonstrated experimentally later. Let us denote the bit to
be estimated by b and the collection of correlated bits, or the
context, by Θ. According to the Bayes’ theorem, we compute
P (b = 0|Θ) ∝ P (Θ|b = 0)P (b = 0),
P (b = 1|Θ) ∝ P (Θ|b = 1)P (b = 1), (44)
where P (b) is the prior probability of the hypothesis of b,
P (Θ|b) is the likelihood of observing the evidence Θ given
the hypothesis of b, and P (b|Θ) is the posterior probability of
the hypothesis of b given the observed evidence Θ. Therefore,
the inference about the value of b is made by
b˜ = arg max
b∈{0,1}
P (b|Θ). (45)
As a result, we learn the Bayesian probability table from a
large number of image samples and predict the bits by the
lookup table, as illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Bayesian probability table, in which each column represents a
possible context and each row represents a possible bit value.
Θ1 Θ2 · · ·
b = 0 P (b = 0|Θ1) P (b = 0|Θ2) · · ·
b = 1 P (b = 1|Θ1) P (b = 1|Θ2) · · ·
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In the following experiments, we test the schemes on 8-bit
greyscale images of size 512 × 512, as shown in Fig. 6.
We use the RSA and the Paillier cryptosystems as examples
of multiplicative and additive homomorphic cryptosystems,
respectively. Two prime numbers for the cryptosystems are
p = 7907 and q = 7919 so that the bit-length of message is
blog2 pqc = 25. Accordingly, for each bit-plane of an image,
we convert every segment of 25 bits into a decimal number in
order to fit the encryption function, where the marginal bits
are negligible. The number of iterations for the total variation
algorithm is set to 2000 since empirically it produces stable
results. The Bayesian probability table is learned from a thou-
sand image samples in the BOSSBase [47]. We begin with
the analysis of three-way trade-off between capacity, fidelity,
and reversibility. Then, we make comparisons between the
proposed schemes and the state-of-the-art. The capacity is
represented by the number of bits embedded in an image,
whereas the fidelity and reversibility are measured by the
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). Let ui,j and uˆi,j denote
a pixel and its noisy counterpart respectively, where i and j
specify the pixel coordinates. The PSNR (in dB) is defined as
PSNR = 10× log10
2552
MSE
. (46)
where the mean square error (MSE) is calculated by
MSE =
1
512× 512
512∑
i=1
512∑
j=1
(ui,j − uˆi,j)2. (47)
The fidelity is quantified by the PSNR between the original
and the marked images, and in a similar manner, the re-
versibility is evaluated by the PSNR between the original and
the recovered images. For further analysis, we also measure
the reversibility in terms of the number of bit errors in the
following discussions.
•Capacity-fidelity trade-off: The trade-off between capac-
ity and fidelity is visualised in Fig. 7(a), which shows that the
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RSA-based scheme achieves higher fidelity than the Paillier-
based scheme under the same capacity (2000 bits). The
reason is straightforward: when the noise occurs, the former
only introduces a random distortion while the latter inflicts
a maximal distortion. Note that the fidelity is not content-
dependent according to our scheme design. The impact of the
selection of different bit-planes as the watermarking channel
is shown in Table 2. It is intuitive that the fidelity of marked
images decreases drastically when a more significant bit-
plane is engaged to carry watermark information.
• Capacity-reversibility trade-off: The trade-off between
capacity and reversibility is illustrated in Fig. 7(b). To assess
the capacity-reversibility trade-off, we control the capacity
by selecting different bit-planes for watermarking in such
a way that the fidelity remains at 48 dB, and then observe
the change of reversibility. Note that here we express the
reversibility in terms of the number of bit errors in order
to amplify the trend. If the reversibility is quantified by
the PSNR, the proportionality may be indeterminate since
a higher decoding error rate does not necessarily mean a
lower visual quality. For instance, several errors occur on
an insignificant bit-plane may still result in a higher visual
quality than a single error on a relatively significant bit-plane.
It is observed that the reversibility decreases as the capacity
increases. It is due to the fact that we embed less amount
of information into the more significant bit-plane and more
amount into the less significant bit-plane in order to keep the
fidelity at a fixed level.
• Fidelity-reversibility trade-off: The trade-off between
capacity and reversibility is illustrated in Fig. 7(c). In a
similar way, we evaluate the fidelity-reversibility trade-off
by setting the capacity to 2000 bits, controlling the fidelity
with the selection of encodable bit-plane, and observing
the change of reversibility. It is evident that the Paillier-
based scheme is advantageous in terms of the reversibility
compared to the RSA-based scheme. This is because that
the Paillier-based scheme inflicts a stronger noise to the host
media, which is more distinguishable and removable than a
faint noise imposed by the RSA-based scheme. On top of
that, it is shown that the predictor based on total variation
achieves higher reversibility than the predictor based on the
Bayesian inference. Moreover, it can be observed that the
reversibility is inversely proportional to the fidelity.
More comprehensive experimental results are demon-
strated in Table 3, where a variety of images are tested
with every possible combination of encoding and decoding
mechanisms. It is witnessed that the error-free performance
is achievable in practice. It can be observed that the error rate
generally approaches zero when embedding payloads into a
comparatively more significant bit-plane. From the previous
analyses, we conclude that
• Capacity is inversely proportional to fidelity.
• Capacity is inversely proportional to reversibility.
• Fidelity is inversely proportional to reversibility.
• The RSA-based scheme preserves higher fidelity than
the Paillier-based scheme.
(a) Airplane (b) Barbara (c) Cameraman
(d) Lena (e) Mandrill (f) Peppers
FIGURE 6. Greyscale test images of size 512× 512 with 256 tonal options.
• The Paillier-based scheme achieves higher reversibility
than the RSA-based scheme.
• The predictor based on total variation is more content-
adaptive and results in higher reversibility than that
based on Bayesian inference.
• The predictor based on Bayesian inference consumes
less computational power in decoding than that based
on total variation.
In the following, we compare the scheme performance
with the state-of-the-art. We begin by classifying the existing
reversible watermarking schemes compatible with public-key
cryptosystems [32]–[36], as presented in Table 4. As far as
we are aware, our work is one of the pioneering research
on the schemes compatible with public-key homomorphic
cryptosystems under the condition that neither additional bit
padding nor specific pre-processing is undertaken. Although
schemes addressing this strictly defined problem are hardly
found, we remark that this design principle was followed
in the earlier literature of schemes based on traditional
symmetric-key cryptosystems. In order to make paralleled
and meaningful comparisons, the proposed schemes are com-
pared with those under the same, or at least similar, research
constraint [48]–[50]. We test the fidelity and reversibility be-
tween different schemes by embedding randomly generated
2000 bits into various host images. It is observed from Table
5 that the visual qualities of various host images are similar
for any listed encoding algorithm and thus it is evident that
the fidelity is not content-dependent. Yet, different schemes
and configurations result in different fidelity. It is shown that
the RSA-based and Paillier-based schemes preserves com-
paratively high fidelity when embedding payloads into the
third bit-plane. From Table 6, we can further observe that the
proposed schemes achieve relatively high reversibility, espe-
cially when using the total variation technique for decoding.
When the sixth bit-plane is used as the embedding channel,
the proposed schemes show the error-free performance on
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FIGURE 7. The three way trade-off between capacity, fidelity, and reversibility
measured on the image Lena.
most of the test images. Even when embedding payloads
into the third bit-plane, the reversibility is higher than the
average in most cases. The experimental results show that
the proposed schemes achieve a remarkable balance between
fidelity and reversibility under the given capacity constraint.
On top of this, the proposed schemes share the advantages of
the modern public-key cryptosystems.
TABLE 2. Fidelity evaluation of RSA-based and Paillier-based schemes by
using different bit-planes as the watermarking channel. It shows the PSNR (in
dB) of the marked image Lena.
RSA Paillier
l = 1 67.59 64.25
l = 2 61.19 58.41
l = 3 55.46 52.43
l = 4 49.46 46.28
l = 5 43.27 39.86
l = 6 37.58 34.22
l = 7 31.18 28.09
l = 8 25.31 21.96
(a) Capacity: 500 bits
RSA Paillier
l = 1 64.32 61.28
l = 2 58.32 55.10
l = 3 52.17 49.23
l = 4 46.29 43.39
l = 5 40.32 37.20
l = 6 34.11 31.25
l = 7 28.41 25.28
l = 8 22.37 19.12
(b) Capacity: 1000 bits
RSA Paillier
l = 1 62.53 59.70
l = 2 56.55 53.42
l = 3 50.61 47.62
l = 4 44.40 41.47
l = 5 38.48 35.33
l = 6 32.56 29.49
l = 7 26.57 23.53
l = 8 20.29 17.53
(c) Capacity: 1500 bits
RSA Paillier
l = 1 61.29 58.23
l = 2 55.57 52.26
l = 3 49.41 46.26
l = 4 43.32 40.31
l = 5 37.08 34.18
l = 6 31.18 28.32
l = 7 25.09 22.18
l = 8 19.05 16.30
(d) Capacity: 2000 bits
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper considers the problem of entrusting the water-
marking operation to a cloud service provider without under-
mining data privacy. Constructing reversible watermarking
schemes compatible with public-key cryptosystems is of non-
trivial challenge since there is virtually no data redundancy
to be exploited in the encrypted domain. The recent devel-
opment of various schemes required the host media either to
be enciphered in a redundant fashion or to be pre-processed
prior to encryption. To address these limits, we propose a
novel paradigm and derive different schemes compatible with
different types of public-key homomorphic cryptosystems.
The host image is encrypted in such a fashion that a suffi-
ciently long sequence of bits, instead of a pixel, is regarded as
input to the encryptor. It significantly reduces the size of the
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TABLE 3. Reversibility evaluation of different combinations of encoding and decoding components. It shows the PSNR (in dB) and the number of bit errors of the
recovered images in which 2000 random bits are embedded.
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 65.38 403 63.10 667 71.61 102 63.75 581 62.36 795 62.82 715
l = 2 64.38 135 59.20 417 81.24 3 60.90 285 56.53 760 58.43 500
l = 3 69.10 13 59.18 112 ∞ 0 64.06 39 52.44 489 56.41 205
l = 4 ∞ 0 60.90 20 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 50.22 216 56.41 10
l = 5 ∞ 0 63.60 3 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 54.21 23 ∞ 0
l = 6 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 7 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 8 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
(a) RSA + TV
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 62.85 706 61.82 886 67.51 249 62.02 859 61.90 882 61.68 915
l = 2 59.24 404 56.09 830 74.06 16 56.32 796 55.68 917 55.83 882
l = 3 62.04 60 52.93 434 ∞ 0 54.89 282 49.93 876 51.23 645
l = 4 ∞ 0 55.76 61 ∞ 0 61.60 17 45.54 599 54.33 87
l = 5 ∞ 0 61.60 4 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 45.42 160 ∞ 0
l = 6 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 49.88 15 ∞ 0
l = 7 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 8 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
(b) RSA + Bayes
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 64.30 253 60.78 569 74.53 24 61.41 492 59.37 787 60.09 667
l = 2 68.00 27 58.62 234 ∞ 0 60.76 143 54.06 669 56.46 385
l = 3 ∞ 0 63.28 20 ∞ 0 73.28 2 50.87 348 58.16 65
l = 4 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 50.68 91 ∞ 0
l = 5 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 6 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 7 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 8 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
(c) Paillier + TV
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 59.60 746 58.42 979 65.64 186 58.51 960 58.42 981 58.31 1004
l = 2 57.11 331 52.69 916 ∞ 0 53.10 833 52.32 999 52.41 977
l = 3 65.15 13 51.45 305 ∞ 0 53.46 192 46.60 932 48.32 626
l = 4 ∞ 0 59.48 12 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 42.61 584 55.36 31
l = 5 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 45.33 78 ∞ 0
l = 6 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 7 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
l = 8 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
(d) Paillier + Bayes
encrypted data and improves the space efficiency. In addition
to this, we suggest to encrypt different bit-planes separately
in order to control the fidelity factor. Any specific data pre-
processing is not required in order to promote the practicality
and universality. For the RSA-like cryptosystems that per-
mit multiplicative homomorphic computation, the proposed
scheme is flexible in terms of embedding capacity. As for
the Paillier-like cryptosystems that allow additive operation
as well as partial multiplicative operation, we propose a
scheme which is optimal with respect to the reversibility.
Furthermore, we develop content-adaptive predictors based
on variational method and statistical inference for assisting
watermark decoding. Both online and offline prediction al-
gorithms are provided in order to suit different operational
requirements. We remark that the decoding errors are in-
evitable from a theoretical point of view and yet in practice
the error rate approaches zero at a low expense of the fidelity
and capacity. Experimental results show that the proposed
schemes achieve remarkable balance between fidelity and
reversibility under the given capacity constraint. From our
perspective, it is of great significance to develop privacy-
aware watermarking methodology suitable for a variety of
modern cryptosystems. On top of this, more practical appli-
cations, such as privacy protection in the Internet of Things,
deserves further investigation.
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TABLE 4. Classification of reversible watermarking schemes compatible with public-key cryptosystems.
Proposed Wu et al. [32] Wu et al. [33] Li and Li [34] Zhang et al. [35] Xiang and Luo [36]
Bit-padding No Yes Yes Yes No No
Pre-processing No No No No Yes Yes
TABLE 5. Fidelity comparison with the state-of-the-art. It shows the PSNR (in dB) of the marked images in which 2000 random bits are embedded.
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
RSA (l = 3) 49.27 49.32 49.47 49.43 49.13 49.19
RSA (l = 6) 31.13 31.08 31.31 31.18 31.32 31.19
Paillier (l = 3) 46.18 46.36 46.10 46.25 46.26 46.23
Paillier (l = 6) 28.14 28.37 28.17 28.32 28.26 28.16
Zhang [48] 41.11 41.04 40.98 41.06 41.04 41.0
Wu and Sun (l = 3) [49] 46.30 46.16 46.33 46.29 46.16 46.27
Wu and Sun (l = 6) [49] 28.25 28.39 28.25 28.43 28.38 28.22
Liao and Shu [50] 41.12 41.04 41.05 41.04 41.03 41.04
TABLE 6. Reversibility comparison with the state-of-the-art. It shows the PSNR (in dB) and the number of bit errors of the recovered images in which 2000 random
bits are embedded.
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
RSA + TV (l = 3) 69.10 13 59.18 112 ∞ 0 64.06 39 52.44 489 56.41 205
RSA + TV (l = 6) ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
RSA + Bayes (l = 3) 62.04 60 52.93 434 ∞ 0 54.89 282 49.93 876 51.23 645
RSA + Bayes (l = 6) ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 49.88 15 ∞ 0
Paillier + TV (l = 3) ∞ 0 63.28 20 ∞ 0 73.28 2 50.87 348 58.16 65
Paillier + TV (l = 6) ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
Paillier + Bayes (l = 3) 65.15 13 51.45 305 ∞ 0 53.46 192 46.60 932 48.32 626
Paillier + Bayes (l = 6) ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
Zhang [48] 55.09 71 48.93 169 54.38 85 57.10 28 46.16 309 54.57 47
Wu and Sun (l = 3) [49] ∞ 0 58.58 59 ∞ 0 69.30 5 50.03 423 57.66 73
Wu and Sun (l = 6) [49] ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0 ∞ 0
Liao and Shu [50] 60.73 13 57.57 23 67.56 3 62.46 7 52.54 70 58.13 20
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